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Abstract 
Creativity is a fundamental feature of human intelligence, and a challenge for AI. AI techniques 
can be used to create new ideas in three ways: by producing novel combinations of familiar ideas; 
by exploring the potential of conceptual spaces; and by making transformations that enable the 
generation of previously impossible ideas. AI will have less difficulty in modelling the generation of 
new ideas than in automating their evaluation. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Why AI must try to model creativity 
Creativity is a fundamental feature of human intelligence, and an inescapable challenge 
for AI. Even technologically oriented AI cannot ignore it, for creative programs could be 
very useful in the laboratory or the market-place. And AI-models intended (or considered) 
as part of cognitive science can help psychologists to understand how it is possible for 
human minds to be creative. 
Creativity is not a special “faculty”, nor a psychological property confined to a tiny elite. 
Rather, it is a feature of human intelligence in general. It is grounded in everyday capacities 
such as the association of ideas, reminding, perception, analogical thinking, searching 
a structured problem-space, and reflective self-criticism. It involves not only a cognitive 
dimension (the generation of new ideas) but also motivation and emotion, and is closely 
linked to cultural context and personality factors [3]. Current AI models of creativity focus 
primarily on the cognitive dimension. 
A creative idea is one which is novel, surprising, and valuable (interesting, useful, 
beautiful. .). But “novel” has two importantly different senses here. The idea may be novel 
with respect only to the mind of the individual (or AI-system) concerned or, so far as we 
know, to the whole of previous history. The ability to produce novelties of the former kind 
may be called P-creativity (P for psychological), the latter H-creativity (H for historical). 
P-creativity is the more fundamental notion, of which H-creativity is a special case. 
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AI should concentrate primarily on P-creativity. If it manages to model this in a powerful 
manner, then artificial H-creativity will occur in some cases-indeed, it already has, as we 
shall see. (In what follows, I shall not use the letter-prefixes: usually, it is P-creativity which 
is at issue.) 
2. Three types of creativity 
There are three main types of creativity, involving different ways of generating the novel 
ideas. Each of the three results in surprises, but only one (the third) can lead to the “shock’ 
of surprise that greets an apparently impossible idea [2]. All types include some H-creative 
examples, but the creators celebrated in the history books are more often valued for their 
achievements in respect of the third type of creativity. 
The first type involves novel (improbable) combinations of familiar ideas. Let us 
call this “combinational” creativity. Examples include much poetic imagery, and also 
analogy-wherein the two newly associated ideas share some inherent conceptual 
structure. Analogies are sometimes explored and developed at some length, for purposes 
of rhetoric or problem-solving. But even the mere generation, or appreciation, of an apt 
analogy involves a (not necessarily conscious) judicious structural mapping, whereby the 
similarities of structure are not only noticed but are judged in terms of their strength and 
depth. 
The second and third types are closely linked, and more similar to each other than 
either is to the first. They are “exploratory” and “transformational” creativity. The former 
involves the generation of novel ideas by the exploration of structured conceptual spaces. 
This often results in structures (“ideas”) that are not only novel, but unexpected. One can 
immediately see, however, that they satisfy the canons of the thinking-style concerned. 
The latter involves the transformation of some (one or more) dimension of the space, 
so that new structures can be generated which could not have arisen before. The more 
fundamental the dimension concerned, and the more powerful the transformation, the more 
surprising the new ideas will be. These two forms of creativity shade into one another, since 
exploration of the space can include minimal “tweaking” of fairly superficial constraints. 
The distinction between a tweak and a transform is to some extent a matter of judgement, 
but the more well-defined the space, the clearer this distinction can be. 
Many human beings-including (for example) most professional scientists, artists, 
and jazz-musicians-make a justly respected living out of exploratory creativity. That 
is, they inherit an accepted style of thinking from their culture, and then search it, 
and perhaps superficially tweak it, to explore its contents, boundaries, and potential. 
But human beings sometimes transform the accepted conceptual space, by altering or 
removing one (or more) of its dimensions, or by adding a new one. Such transformation 
enables ideas to be generated which (relative to that conceptual space) were previously 
impossible. 
The more fundamental the transformation, and/or the more fundamental the dimension 
that is transformed, the more different the newly-possible structures will be. The shock 
of amazement that attends such (previously impossible) ideas is much greater than the 
surprise occasioned by mere improbabilities, however unexpected they may be. If the 
M.A. &den /Artificial Intelligence 103 (1998) 347-356 349 
transformations are too extreme, the relation between the old and new spaces will not 
be immediately apparent. In such cases, the new structures will be unintelligible, and very 
likely rejected. Indeed, it may take some time for the relation between the two spaces to be 
recognized and generally accepted. 
3. Computer models of creativity 
Computer models of creativity include examples of all three types. As yet, those 
focussed on the second (exploratory) type are the most successful. That’s not to say 
that exploratory creativity is easy to reproduce. On the contrary, it typically requires 
considerable domain-expertise and analytic power to define the conceptual space in the first 
place, and to specify procedures that enable its potential to be explored. But combinational 
and transformational creativity are even more elusive. 
The reasons for this, in brief, are the difficulty of approaching the richness of human 
associative memory, and the difficulty of identifying our values and of expressing them in 
computational form. The former difficulty bedevils attempts to simulate combinational 
creativity. The latter difficulty attends efforts directed at any type of creativity, but is 
especially problematic with respect to the third (see Section 4, below). 
Combinational creativity is studied in AI by research on (for instance) jokes and analogy. 
Both of these require some sort of semantic network, or inter-linked knowledge-base, as 
their ground. Clearly, pulling random associations out of such a source is simple. But an 
association may not be telling, or appropriate in context. For all combinational tasks other 
than “free association”, the nature and structure of the associative linkage is important too. 
Ideally, every product of the combinational program should be at least minimally apt, and 
the originality of the various combinations should be assessable by the AI-system. 
A recent, and relatively successful, example of AI-generated (combinational) humour is 
Jape, a program for producing punning riddles [I]. Jape produces jokes based on nine 
general sentence-forms, such as: What do you get when you cross X with Y?; What 
kind of X has Y?; What kind of X can Y?; What’s the difference between an X and 
a Y? The semantic network used by the program incorporates knowledge of phonology, 
semantics, syntax, and spelling. Different combinations of these aspects of words are used. 
in distinctly structured ways, for generating each joke-type. 
Examples of riddles generated by Jape include: (Q) What kind of murderer has fibre? 
(A) A cereal killer; (Q) What do you call a strange market? (A) A bizarre bazaar; (Q) What 
do you call a depressed train? (A) A low-comotive; and (Q) What’s the difference between 
leaves and a car? (A) One you brush and rake, the other you rush and brake. These may 
not send us into paroxysms of laughter-although, in a relaxed social setting, one or two 
of them might. But they are all amusing enough to prompt wryly appreciative groans. 
Binsted did a systematic series of psychological tests, comparing people’s reception 
of Jape’s riddles with their response to human-originated jokes published in joke-books. 
She also compared Jape’s products with “non-jokes” generated by random combinations. 
She found, for instance, that children, by whom such humour is most appreciated, can 
distinguish reliably between jokes (including Jape’s riddles) and non-jokes. Although they 
generally find human-originated jokes funnier than Jape’s, this difference vanishes if Jape’s 
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output is pruned, SO as to omit the items generated by the least successful schemata. The 
riddles published in human joke-books are highly selected, for only those the author finds 
reasonably funny will appear in print. 
Binsted had set herself a challenging task: to ensure that every one of Jape’s jokes 
would be amusing. Her follow-up research showed that although none were regarded as 
exceptionally funny, very few produced no response at all. This contrasts with some other 
Al-models of creativity, such as AM [ 161, where a high proportion of the newly generated 
structures are not thought interesting by human beings. 
It does not follow that all Al-modelling of creativity should emulate Binsted’s ambition. 
This is especially true if the system is meant to be used interactively by human beings, 
to help their own creativity by prompting them to think about ideas that otherwise they 
might not have considered. Some “unsuccessful” products should in any case be allowed, 
as even human creators often produce second-rate, or even inappropriate, ideas. Jape’s 
success is due to the fact that its joke-templates and generative schemata are very limited. 
Binsted identifies a number of aspects of real-life riddles which are not parallelled in Jape, 
and whose (reliably funny) implementation is not possible in the foreseeable future. To 
incorporate these aspects so as to produce jokes that are reliably funny would raise thorny 
questions of evaluation (see Section 4). 
As for AI-models of analogy, most of these generate and evaluate analogies by using 
domain-genera1 mapping rules, applied to prestructured concepts (e.g. [7,12,13]). The 
creators of some of these models have compared them with the results of psychological 
experiments, claiming a significant amount of evidence in support of their domain-general 
approach [8]. In these models, there is a clear distinction between the representation of 
a concept and its mapping onto some other concept. The two concepts involved usually 
remain unchanged by the analogy. 
Some AI-models of analogy allow for a more flexible representation of concepts. 
One example is the Copycat program, a broadly connectionist system that looks for 
analogies between alphabetic letter-strings [ 11,181. Copycat’s concepts are context- 
sensitive descriptions of strings such as “mmpprr” and “klmmno”. The two m’s in the 
first string just listed will be described by Copycat as a pair, but those in the second string 
will be described as the end-points of two different triplets. 
One might rather say that Copycat will “eventually” describe them in these ways. For 
its concepts evolve as processing proceeds. This research is guided by the theoretical 
assumption that seeing a new analogy is much the same as perceiving something in a new 
way. So Copycat does not rely on ready-made, fixed, representations, but constructs its own 
in a context-sensitive way: new analogies and new perceptions develop together. A part- 
built description that seems to be mapping well onto the nascent analogy is maintained, 
and developed further. One that seems to be heading for a dead end is abandoned, and 
an alternative begun which exploits different aspects. The model allows a wide range 
of (more or less daring) analogies to be generated, and evaluated. The degree to which 
the analogies are obvious or far-fetched can be altered by means of one of the system- 
parameters. 
Whether the approach used in Copycat is preferable to the more usual forms of (domain- 
general) mapping is controversial. Hofstadter [ 1 l] criticizes other AI-models of analogy 
for assuming that concepts are unchanging and inflexible, and for guaranteeing that the 
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required analogy (among others) will be found by focussing on small representations 
having the requisite conceptual structures and mapping rules built in. The opposing camp 
rebut these charges [8]. 
They argue that to identify analogical thinking with high-level perception, as Hofstadter 
does, is to use a vague and misleading metaphor: analogical mapping, they insist, is 
a domain-general process which must be analytically distinguished from conceptual 
representation. They point out that the most detailed published account of Copycat 
[ 181 provides just such an analysis, describing the representation-building procedures as 
distinct from, though interacting with, the representation-comparing modules. They report 
that the Structure Mapping Engine (SME), for instance, can be successfully used on 
representations that are “very large” as compared with Copycat’s, some of which were 
built by other systems for independent purposes. They compare Copycat’s alphabetic 
microworld with the “blocks world” of 1970s scene analysis, which ignored most of 
the interesting complexity (and noise) in the real-world. Although their early models 
did not allow for changes in conceptual structure as a result of analogising, they refer 
to work on learning (using SME) involving processes of schema abstraction, inference 
projection, and re-representation [9]. Moreover (as remarked above), they claim that their 
psychological experiments support their approach to simulation. For example, they say 
there is evidence that memory access, in which one is reminded of an (absent) analog, 
depends on psychological processes, and kinds of similarity, significantly different from 
those involved in mapping between two analogs that are presented simultaneously. 
The jury remains out on this dispute. However, it may not be necessary to plump 
absolutely for either side. My hunch is that the Copycat approach is much closer 
to the fluid complexity of human thinking. But domain-general principles of analogy 
are probably important. And these are presumably enriched by many domain-specific 
processes. (Certainly, psychological studies of how human beings retrieve and interpret 
analogies are likely to be helpful.) In short, even combinational creativity is, or can be, a 
highly complex matter. 
The exploratory and transformational types of creativity can also be modelled by 
AI-systems. For conceptual spaces, and ways of exploring and modifying them, can be 
described by computational concepts. 
Occasionally. a “creative” program is said to apply to a wide range of domains, or 
conceptual spaces-as EURISKO. for instance, does [16]. But to make this generalist 
program useful in a particular area, such as genetic engineering or VLSI-design, 
considerable specialist knowledge has to be provided if it is not to generate hosts of 
nonsensical (as opposed to merely boring) ideas. In general, providing a program with 
a representation of an interesting conceptual space, and with appropriate exploratory 
processes, requires considerable domain-expertise on the part of the programmer-or 
at least on the part of someone with whom he cooperates. (Unfortunately, the highly 
subject-bounded institutional structure of most universities works against this sort of 
interdisciplinarity.) 
For example, EMI (experiments in musical intelligence) is a program that composes 
in the styles of Mozart, Stravinsky, Joplin, and others [6]. In order to do this, it employs 
powerful musical grammars expressed as ATNs. In addition, it uses lists of “signatures”: 
melodic, harmonic, metric, and ornamental motifs characteristic of individual composers. 
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Using general rules to vary and intertwine these, it often composes a musical phrase 
near-identical to a signature that has nut been provided. This suggests a systematicity in 
individual composing styles. 
Individual musical style has been addressed also in a pioneering program that improvises 
jazz in real time, though the technique can be applied to other types of music [lo]. The 
most highly developed version, at present, generates jazz in the style of Charlie Parker- 
and (ignoring the lack of expressiveness, and the quality of the synthesized sound) it 
actually sounds like Parker. Besides strong (and relatively general) knowledge of musical 
dimensions such as harmony and rhythm, and of musical conventions characteristic of 
jazz, the system has access to a large set of Parker-specific motifs, which can be varied and 
combined in a number of ways. (The programmer is an accomplished jazz-saxophonist: 
without strong musical skills, he would not be able to identify the relevant motifs, or judge 
the aptness of specific processes for using them.) In exploring this conceptual space, the 
program often originates interesting musical ideas, which jazz-professionals can exploit in 
their own performance. However, in its present form it never moves outside Parker-space: 
its creativity is merely exploratory, not transformational. 
Architectural design, too, has been formally modelled. For instance, a shape-grammar 
describing Frank Lloyd Wright’s Prairie houses generates all the ones he designed, as well 
as others he did not [14]. To the initiated eye, every one of these novel (exploratory- 
creative) structures falls within the genre. The grammar not only identifies the crucial 
dimensions of the relevant architectural space, but also shows which are relatively 
fundamental. In a Prairie house, the addition of a balcony is stylistically superficial, for it is 
a decision on which nothing else (except the appearance and ornamentation of the balcony) 
depends. By contrast, the “addition” of a fireplace results in overall structural change, 
because many design-decisions follow, and depend upon, the (early) decision about the 
fireplace. Exploring this space by making different choices about fireplaces, then, can give 
rise to surprises more fundamental than can adding balconies in unexpected places. 
Perhaps the best-known example of AI-creativity is AARON, a program-or rather, a 
series of programs-for exploring line-drawing in particular styles [ 171 and, more recently, 
colouring also [5]. Written by Harold Cohen, an artist who was already an acclaimed 
professional in the 1960s AARON explores a space defined with the help of rich domain- 
expertise. 
AARON is not focussed primarily on surfaces, but generates some representation of 
a 3D-core, and then draws a line around it. Versions that can draw many idiosyncratic 
portraits use 900 control points to specify the 3D-core, of which 300 specify the structure 
of the face and head. The program’s drawings are aesthetically pleasing, and have been 
exhibited in galleries worldwide. Until very recently, coloured images of AARON’s work 
were hand-painted by Cohen. But in 1995, he exhibited a version of AARON that can 
do this itself. It chooses colours by tonality (light/dark) rather than hue, although it can 
decide to concentrate on a particular family of hues. It draws outlines using a paintbrush, 
but colours the paper by applying five round “paint-blocks” of differing sizes. Some 
characteristic features of the resulting painting style are due to the physical properties of 
the dyes and painting-blocks rather than to the program guiding their use. Like drawing- 
AARON, painting-AARON is still under continuous development. 
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The drawings (and paintings) are individually unpredictable because of random choices, 
but all the drawings produced by a given version of AARON will have the same style. 
AARON cannot reflect on its own productions, nor adjust them so as to make them better. 
It cannot even transform its conceptual space, leaving aside the question of whether this 
results in something “better”. In this, it resembles most current AI-programs focussed on 
creativity. 
A further example of exploratory AI-creativity is the BACON suite designed to model 
scientific discovery [15]. The heuristics used by the BACON system are carefully pre- 
programmed, and the data are deliberately prestructured so as to suit the heuristics 
provided. New types of discovery are impossible for BACON. It is therefore misleading 
to name such programs after scientists remembered for noticing relations of a type never 
noticed before. Even the notion that there may be (for instance) some linear mathematical 
relation to be found was a huge creative leap. 
Almost all of today’s “creative” computers are concerned only with exploring pre- 
defined conceptual spaces. They may allow for highly constrained tweaking, but no 
fundamental novelties or truly shocking surprises are possible. However, a few AI-systems 
attempt not only to explore their conceptual space but also to transform it, sometimes in 
relatively unconstrained ways. 
Transformational systems include AM and EURISKO [ 161, and certain programs based 
on genetic algorithms. Some of these have produced valued structures that the human 
experts say they could never have produced unaided: the sculptor William Latham, for 
example, has generated 3D-forms of a type which he could not have imagined for 
himself [22]. 
Most GA-programs only explore a pre-given space, seeking the “optimal” location 
within it. But some also transform their generative mechanism in a more or less 
fundamental way. For example, GA-work in graphics may enable superficial tweaking of 
the conceptual space, resulting in images which, although novel, clearly belong to the same 
family as those which went before [22]. Or it may allow the core of the image-generating 
code to be lengthened and complexified, so that the novel images may bear no family- 
resemblance even to their parents, still less to their more remote ancestors [21]. Similarly, 
some work in evolutionary robotics has generated novel sensory-motor anatomies and 
control systems as a result of GAS that allow the length of the “genome” to be altered [4]. 
One should not assume that transformation is always creative, or even-in the present 
state of the art-that AI-systems that can transform their rules are superior to those which 
cannot. Significantly, some AI-modellers deliberately avoid giving their programs the 
capacity to change the heart of the code. That is, they prevent fundamental transformations 
in the conceptual space, allowing only exploration and relatively superficial tweaking. One 
reason for this is the human may be more interested, at least for a time, in exploring a 
given space than in transforming it in unpredictable ways. A professional sculptor such as 
Latham, for instance, may wish to explore the potential (and limits) of one particular family 
of 3D-structures, before considering others [ 221. Another reason for avoiding rampant 
transformation in AI-models of creativity is the difficulty of automating evaluation. 
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4. The evaluation of new ideas 
A main reason why most current AI-models of creativity attempt only exploration, not 
transformation, is that if the space is transformed then the resulting structures may not have 
any interest or value. Such ideas are novel, certainly, but not creative. (We saw in Section 1 
that “creativity” implies positive evaluation.) 
This would not matter if the AI-system were able to realize the poor quality of the 
new constructions, and drop (or amend) the transformation accordingly. A truly automatic 
AI-creator would have evaluative mechanisms sufficiently powerful to do this. At present, 
this is very rarely so (an exception is artificial co-evolution in which the fitness function 
evolves alongside the several species involved [19]). Notoriously, AM produced many 
more useless items than powerful mathematical ideas, and although it did have heuristics 
of “interestingness” built into it, its evaluations were often mistaken by human standards. 
And some “adventurously” transformational programs embody no evaluative criteria at all, 
the evaluation being done interactively by human beings [2 11. 
There is no reason in principle why future AI-models should not embody evaluative 
criteria powerful enough to allow them to transform their conceptual spaces in fruitfully 
creative (including H-creative) ways. But for such computerized self-criticism to be 
possible, the programmers must be able to express the values concerned sufficiently clearly 
for them to be implemented. Even if the values are not predetermined, being represented 
instead as an evolving fitness function, the relevant features must be implemented in and 
recognized by the (GA) system. 
To some extent, this can be achieved implicitly, by defining a culturally accepted 
conceptual space so successfully that any structure that can be generated by the program 
will be accepted by humans as valuable [5,14]. But the structures generated within newly 
transformed spaces will need types of evaluation different (at least in part) from those 
implicit within the original space, or previously provided in explicit form. 
It is even more difficult to express (verbally or computationally) just what it is that we 
like about a Bach fugue, or an impressionist painting, than it is to recognize something as 
an acceptable member of one of those categories. And to say what it is that we like (or 
even dislike) about a new, or previously unfamiliar, form of music or painting is even more 
challenging. 
Identifying the criteria we use in our evaluations is hard enough. Justifying, or even 
(causally) explaining, our reliance on those criteria is more difficult still. For example, 
just why we like or dislike something will often have a lot to do with motivational and 
emotional factors-considerations about which current Al has almost nothing to say. 
To make matters worse, human values-and therefore the novelties which we are 
prepared to approve as “creative”+hange from culture to culture, and from time to time. 
In some cases, they do so in unpredictable and irrational ways: think of the fashion- 
industry, for example, or of rogue memes like the back-to-front baseball-cap. Nor are 
value-shifts confined to trivial cases such as these: even Bach, Mozart, and Donne were 
ignored and/or criticized in certain periods. 
The scientific criteria of theoretical elegance and coherence, and of experimental 
verification, are less variable than artistic values. But that’s not to say they are easy to 
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define, or to implement. (An attempt o do so, for certain sorts of mathematical symmetry, 
has been made by the BACON team.) 
Moreover, science too has its equivalent of fad and fashion. Even the discovery of 
dinosaurs was not a cut-and-dried event, but the culmination of a process of scientific- 
and political-nationalistic-negotiation lasting for several years [20]. The important point 
is that what scientists count as “creative”, and what they call a “discovery”, depends largely 
on unarticulated values, including social considerations of various kinds. These social 
evaluations are often invisible to scientists. For sure, they are not represented in AI-models. 
5. Conclusion 
Some H-creative ideas have already been generated by AI-programs, though usually by 
merely exploratory (or combinational) procedures. Transformational AI-originality is only 
just beginning. 
The two major bottlenecks are: 
(1) domain-expertise, which is required for mapping the conceptual space that is to be 
explored and/or transformed; and 
(2) valuation of the results, which is especially necessary-and especially difficult-for 
transformational programs. 
These two bottlenecks interact, since subtle valuation requires considerable domain 
expertise. Valuation, thus far, is mostly implicit in the generative procedures used by 
the program, or interactively imposed by a human being. Only a few AI-models can 
critically judge their own original ideas, And hardly any can combine evaluation with 
transformation. 
The ultimate vindication of AI-creativity would be a program that generated novel ideas 
which initially perplexed or even repelled us, but which was able to persuade us that they 
were indeed valuable. We are a very long way from that. 
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